Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

10-6-2022

"The Rule” and the Constitution: Witness Exclusion and the Right
to a Public Trial
Stephen E. Smith
Santa Clara University School of Law, sesmith@scu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

Automated Citation
Stephen E. Smith, "The Rule” and the Constitution: Witness Exclusion and the Right to a Public Trial , 56
U.I.C. LAW REVIEW 1 (2022),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/1002

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

“THE RULE” AND THE CONSTITUTION: WITNESS
EXCLUSION AND THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL
STEPHEN E. SMITH*
Federal and state rules of evidence provide for the exclusion of
potential witnesses from the courtroom. But, in criminal proceedings, the
Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial presumes that a courtroom will be
open. The public trial right has been widely interpreted to restrict even
“partial closures” – the exclusion of an individual or group from a criminal
courtroom. The rule on witnesses is potentially at odds with the right to a
public trial. Witness exclusion, by rule, is almost automatic. The Sixth
Amendment, on the other hand, requires heightened scrutiny before
individuals may be excluded from the courtroom. Criminal defendants have
accordingly objected to the exclusion of witnesses from their trials as
violations of the right to a public trial. This short article concludes that
there are two reasons that standard implementation of the Rule is not a
Sixth Amendment violation. The first is that historical understandings of the
Sixth Amendment’s public trial right would have contemplated the use of
longstanding witness sequestration rules. The second is that witness
sequestration causes no meaningful prejudice to the amendment’s
purposes. This article also concludes that there are some circumstances
where sequestration requests must give way to Sixth Amendment demands
and proposes an approach to distinguishing between routine exclusions and
those that demand a more searching inquiry.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The exclusion of witnesses from courtrooms before their testimony
is standard practice, in compliance with federal and state rules of
evidence.1 But the exclusion of individuals from a courtroom can violate
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. 2 Criminal
* Associate Clinical Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. This work was
supported by a grant from the author’s institution. The author is grateful for the
assistance provided by the editors of UIC Law Review.
1. See infra section II.
2. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial . . .”).
1
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defendants have occasionally argued,3 largely unsuccessfully, that the
exclusion of witnesses pursuant to rules of evidence violates their Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial. Courts addressing the issue have
provided little analysis of the tension between the two commands. But, if
the exclusion4 of particular individuals from a courtroom necessarily
implicates the Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial, witness
sequestration rules are in trouble.
Federal Rule of Evidence 615 and its state law equivalents are often
referred to, shorthand, as “The Rule.” 5 That is how common witness
sequestration is – out of all the rules of evidence (and manifold other rules
that may apply in a legal proceeding), it is honored as “The Rule.” The Rule
mandates that, on request of a party, potential witnesses must leave the
courtroom.6 The reason is obvious enough. Parties fear that a witness will
fabricate or perhaps “adapt” testimony to account for the testimony of
other witnesses. It makes sense to want to hear the witness’s testimony
without the influence upon it of what other witnesses have had to say.
The Sixth Amendment, on the other hand, guarantees, in part, the
right to a public trial.7 It insists on the presence of observers, not their
exclusion.8 The scope of the right has been sketched only roughly by the
Supreme Court, in few decisions. 9 Most courts, however, apply its
strictures to “partial” closures of criminal courtrooms. 10 These partial
closures are exclusions of particular members of the courtroom audience,
rather than a blanket exclusion of the public from the court.
To the extent that the exclusion of any member of the courtroom
audience requires constitutional scrutiny, the automatic exclusion that
the Rule provides is contrary to the Sixth Amendment’s demands. Many
courts have interpreted the Sixth Amendment to require careful
scrutiny,11 complete with fact finding, before anyone may be excluded
from the courtroom. Accordingly, the common courtroom management
practice of witness exclusion may be regularly and repeatedly
3. See infra Section IV.A.
4. Because both words are commonly used, this article will toggle between
“exclusion” and “sequestration” and their verb forms.
5. See Timothy D. O’Leary, What Rule?, 50 J. MO. B. 147 (1994) (“As the
trial begins, the attorney for the defendant requests that the court enforce the
‘rule.’ The judge, knowingly, orders, ‘The rule will be enforced.’”) (referring to
Missouri practice). See also Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976)
(noting “‘the rule on witnesses,’ as the practice of sequestering witnesses is
sometimes called. . .”) (referring to federal practice).
6. FED. R. EVID. 615. The rule applies to both criminal and civil proceedings.
See FED. R. EVID. 1101(b).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. Id.
9. The Supreme Court has addressed the Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial only three times in the past fifty years: Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39
(1984); Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010) (per curiam); Weaver v.
Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017).
10. See infra Section III.
11. Such as strict or intermediate scrutiny. See infra text accompanying notes 5469.
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unconstitutionally implemented.
The few courts that have faced this issue have by and large treated
it summarily, rejecting constitutional challenges to exclusions ordered
under the Rule.12 They have reached the right conclusion, but have not
explained it adequately. This short article is intended to provide a more
careful analysis. It concludes that there are two reasons that standard
implementation of the Rule is not a Sixth Amendment violation. The
primary reason is that historical understandings of the Sixth
Amendment’s public trial right would have contemplated longstanding
witness sequestration rules. The second reason is that witness
sequestration causes no meaningful prejudice to the amendment’s
purposes. This article also concludes that there are, nonetheless, rare
circumstances where sequestration requests must give way to Sixth
Amendment demands and proposes an approach to distinguishing
between routine exclusions and those that require a more searching
inquiry.

II.

THE RULE

Witness sequestration is standard operating procedure for the
nation’s courts. An example of the practice is Federal Rule of Evidence
615, which provides that: “[a]t a party’s request, the court must order
witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony.
Or the court may do so on its own.” 13 This is no idiosyncrasy of federal
law – the states have equivalent rules, effected either by statute,14 rule15,
or common law.16 The Rule can claim both a “time-honored pedigree and
universal acceptance.”17 This article will largely refer to Rule 615 as a
stand-in for the Rule in its various forms; distinctions between different
formulations of sequestration are not its focus.
There is no requirement that a witness subject to exclusion under
the Rule be included on a witness list, or even be certain to be called. For
instance, in United States v. Warner,18 the defendant requested that his
wife and ex-wife be permitted to remain in the courtroom, over an
exclusion request by the prosecutor. They were not on the government’s
witness list, “but Defendants [had] not ruled out the possibility that they
will be called in Defendants' own case.”19 The court “urge[d] the parties
to craft stipulations that would render their testimony unnecessary.
Absent such precautions, however, family members who may be called as

12. See infra Section IV. A.
13. FED. R. EVID. 615.
14. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 777.
15. E.g., OHIO EVID. R. 615.
16. Lynch v. State, 551 S.W.3d 70, 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018).
17. Daniel J. Capra & Liesa L. Richter, “The” Rule: Modernizing the Potent, but
Overlooked, Rule of Witness Sequestration, 63 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (2021).
18. United States v. Warner, No. 02 CR 506, 2005 WL 2367769, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
23, 2005).
19. Id.
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witnesses will be excluded from the courtroom.”20 The cases have not
proposed any necessary degree of probability of being called before the
Rule may be enforced against a potential witness.21
Rule 615 excepts some categories of witnesses from its scope,
permitting some potential witnesses to remain in the courtroom. 22 This
exception includes parties,23 persons essential to presenting a party’s
claim or defense,24 and those statutorily permitted to remain.25
“The rule is mandatory and requires that witnesses be excluded
pursuant to a sequestration request.”26 Indeed, “Rule 615 carries a
presumption favoring sequestration”27 over finding a witness exempt
from the Rule’s exclusion requirement:
Because a court may only decline to grant a party's request to
sequester particular witnesses under one of the Rule 615 exemptions, the
rule carries a strong presumption in favor of sequestration. The party
opposing sequestration therefore has the burden of demonstrating why
the pertinent Rule 615 exception applies . . . and “why the policy of the
Rule in favor of automatic sequestration is inapplicable in that
situation.”28
Like other evidentiary rulings,29 appellate review of trial court
sequestration decisions is performed under an abuse of discretion
standard.30
The Rule serves a truth-seeking function: “excluding or sequestering
witnesses has long been recognized as a means of discouraging and
exposing fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion.” 31 Sequestration is
imposed “to lessen the danger that [a witness’s] testimony will be
influenced by hearing what other witnesses have to say, and to increase
the likelihood that [witnesses] will confine themselves to truthful

20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. E.g., United States v. Villa-Guillen, 490 F. Supp. 3d 470, 476 (D.P.R. 2020)
(referring to “potential witness” without describing likelihood of witness being called).
22. FED. R. EVID. 615.
23. FED. R. EVID. 615(a)-(b).
24. FED. R. EVID. 615(c) (including, for example, “an expert needed to advise counsel
in the management of the litigation. . .” ). FED. R. EVID. 615 Advisory Committee notes.
25. FED. R. EVID. 615(d). (including, for example, victims of crimes pursuant to the
Crime Victims’ Rights Act). See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3771 (2015).
26. Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of New York, 519 F. Supp. 668, 678
(D. Del. 1981); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 680 (8th Cir. 2003)
(“Sequestration of most witnesses is mandatory when requested. . .”). Historically, the
Rule appears to have been discretionary, but requests were commonly indulged. E.g.,
Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91, 92 (1893) (“Upon the motion or suggestion of
either party, such a direction as that in question is usually given.”). Some states make
the Rule discretionary. E.g., MASS. R. CRIM. P. 21 (Massachusetts rule providing that the
judge “may” order witness exclusion).
27. Opus 3 Ltd. v. Heritage Park, Inc., 91 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir. 1996).
28. United States v. Jackson, 60 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
29. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997).
30. United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 326 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Sequestration of
witnesses [is a matter] within the discretion of the court.”).
31. FED. R. EVID. 615 Advisory Committee Notes.
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statements based on their own recollections.” 32 Evidence scholar Dean
John Wigmore wrote breathlessly of the Rule’s “supreme excellence,” 33
describing it as, next to cross-examination, “one of the greatest engines
that the skill of man has ever invented for the detection of liars in a court
of justice.”34

III. THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial.”35 Like many constitutional rights, however,
the right to public trial is not absolute.36 Courtrooms may be closed to the
public in some situations.37
The right to a public trial extends to many aspects of the trial, from
suppression hearings,38 to voir dire,39 to sentencing.40 The right to a public
trial also applies to the states, incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process guarantee.41 The right may yield to other
rights or interests, but only in rare circumstances, and “the balance of
interests must be struck with special care.”42 A violation of the right to a
public trial is considered “structural” and thus not subject to harmless
error review.43
The Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial manifests “[t]he
traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials.”44 The ultimate
purpose of the public trial is to prevent anything from occurring during
the proceedings that would be subject to public condemnation. 45 It lets us
see what is happening during the trial so that we know no wrongdoing
has occurred. “Our country’s public trial guarantee reflects the founders’
wisdom of the need to cast sunlight—the best of disinfectants—on
criminal trials.”46 Both historical and contemporary commentators have

32. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 281–82 (1989).
33. John H. Wigmore, Sequestration of Witnesses, 14 HARV. L. REV. 475, 482 (1901).
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
36. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Akers, 542 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam)
(“The court had been advised that the proceedings would be disrupted if the verdict
were unfavorable to the appellants. The court could properly conclude that the threat
of harm dictated partial closing of the proceedings.”).
38. Waller, 467 U.S. at 43.
39. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213 (2010).
40. See United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012).
41. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273.
42. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45.
43. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (citing Waller).
44. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 (1948).
45. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 (“[T]he guarantee has always been recognized
as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of
persecution.”).
46. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 607 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., dissenting)
(citing Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It, 92
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emphasized the abuse-deterrence function of the public trial, agreeing
that “if trials are speedy and public, powerful officials will be far less likely
to use their power against innocent men than if trials are protracted and
secret.”47
Beyond this primary abuse-deterrent purpose, a truth-seeking
function is also purportedly served by the public availability of
proceedings. Philosopher Jeremy Bentham contended that publicity is a
“safeguard of testimony”: “[f]alsehood may be bold in a secret
examination; it is difficult for it to be so in public.”48
The Supreme Court has set forth a specific set of purposes it believes
are served by the right to a public trial.49 According to the Court, the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a public trial exists to: (1) “ensure[ ] that judge and
prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly,” (2) “encourage[ ]
witnesses to come forward” and (3) “discourage[ ] perjury.”50
In Waller v. Georgia,51 the Supreme Court set forth the test trial
courts should apply to determine whether courtroom closure is
appropriate.52 The Court held that courtroom closure must satisfy a fourpart test to properly comply with the Sixth Amendment:
[1] the party seeking to close the [proceeding] must advance an overriding
interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader
than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make
findings adequate to support the closure.53

The Waller test is rigorous.54 The test is in the nature of “strict
scrutiny” review.55 Like other government actions reviewed under a strict
(1914)).
47. Max Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 381 (1932); see, e.g.,
State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N.E.2d 127, 136 (Ohio 1976)
(Stern, J., concurring) (“The correction of judicial abuses and the approval of judicial
wisdom and integrity depend alike upon the accessibility of the courts to public
scrutiny.”). “All trials should be public, that opinion, which is the best, or, perhaps, the
only cement of society, may curb the authority of the powerful, and the passions of the
judge.” CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 54 (W.C. Little & Co.
1872) (1764).
48. JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 68 (Etienne Dumont ed.
1825); See also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373
(1768) (“The open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind,
is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth than the private and secret
examination before an officer or his clerk.”).
49. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 48.
52. Id.
53. Id. (adopting test from a courtroom closure case arising under the First
Amendment). See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511-12
(1984)).
54. Johnson v. Sherry, 586 F.3d 439, 447 (6th Cir. 2009).
55. See generally Stephen E. Smith, What's in A Name? Strict Scrutiny and the Right
to A Public Trial, 57 IDAHO L. REV. 447 (2021). Cf. In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 50911) (Observing “[t]he Supreme Court has most recently spoken as if closure orders
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scrutiny standard, the government must demonstrate a strong interest,
along with a solution applied that has been narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.56
The Waller test has been applied not only to complete closures of
trial proceedings, but also to partial closures of court proceedings. 57
“Partial closures” have been described in a variety of ways, but one
succinct definition may be that a “partial closure results in the exclusion
of certain members of the public while other members of the public are
permitted to remain in the courtroom.”58 It occurs “when some of the
public is allowed into the courtroom.”59 Another commentator explains
partial closures by example:
In a partial closure, for example, only members of the defendant's family
might be excluded from the courtroom during the testimony of a single
witness. In a total closure, supposedly exemplified by Waller, “all persons
other than witnesses, court personnel, the parties and their lawyers [are]
excluded for the duration of the hearing.”60

Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on a partial closure
case, there are indications that it would consider a partial closure to be a
species of closure which would require constitutional scrutiny. For
instance, in one early case, the Court opined that “an accused is at the very
least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present.”61 This
suggests that excluding someone in this category would implicate the
Sixth Amendment. More recently, the Court wrote “[t]he problems that
may be encountered by trial courts in deciding whether some closures are
necessary, or even in deciding which members of the public should be
admitted when seats are scarce, are difficult ones.”62 This suggests that the
exclusion of some spectators is not outside the scope of the Sixth
Amendment.
Outside the Supreme Court, it is widely agreed that “[b]oth partial
and total closures burden the defendant's constitutional rights.”63 But,
most courts have applied a slightly different version of the Waller test to

must meet the test of strict scrutiny. . .”).
56. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006) (explaining strict
scrutiny as a two-factor inquiry, requiring that “the governmental ends are
compelling” and “the law is a narrowly tailored means of furthering those
governmental interests.”).
57. See, e.g., State v. Turrietta, 308 P.3d 964, 967 (N.M. 2013).
58. State v. Sams, 802 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
59. Kristin Saetveit, Close Calls: Defining Courtroom Closures Under the Sixth
Amendment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 897, 926 (2016).
60. Daniel Levitas, Scaling Waller: How Courts Have Eroded the Sixth Amendment
Public Trial Right, 59 EMORY L.J. 493, 534–35 (2009) (quoting Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977
F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992)).
61. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 272.
62. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1909 (2017) (emphasis added).
63. Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th Cir. 2001). E.g., United States v. Allen,
34 F.4th 789, 797 (9th Cir. 2022) (subjecting partial closure to Sixth Amendment
scrutiny).
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partial closures.64 While three of the four Waller factors remain
unchanged when a court reviews a partial closure, these courts provide
that in a partial closure case an “overriding interest” need not be shown;
instead, they require only a “substantial reason.”65 “[T]he difference
between the two standards is not perfectly clear, other than the fact that
the reviewing court knows that the ‘substantial reason’ standard is a
more lenient standard than the ‘overriding interest’ standard.” 66 This
“modified Waller test”67 used in partial closure cases hews very closely to
Waller in its original form. 68 The modified Waller test simply minimizes
the showing necessary under Waller’s first factor addressing the strength
of the government interest. It is a type of “intermediate” scrutiny. 69
There are reasons to doubt the validity of the partial closure
doctrine. Partial closures may not be closures at all. The goodgovernment goals of the right to a public trial are satisfied by the doors of
the court being open to the public, generally; specific exclusions are only
faintly significant. The possibility of any member of the public entering
the courtroom at any time, and perusing the proceedings for their
integrity, should keep all the trial’s players from engaging in behavior that
reduces the fairness of proceedings. 70
64. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 797 F.3d 409, 413-14 (6th Cir. 2015)
(citations omitted) (“Nearly all federal courts of appeals . . . have distinguished
between the total closure of proceedings and situations in which a courtroom is only
partially closed to certain spectators.”).
65. See, e.g., Woods, 977 F.2d at 76 (applying “substantial reason” test);
Commonwealth v. Downey, 936 N.E.2d 442, 449 n.12 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (citing
Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 921 N.E.2d 906, 921 (Mass. 2010) (“When a closure
is partial, a ‘substantial reason’ rather than an ‘overriding interest’ may suffice to
justify the closure.”)). But see Turrietta, 308 P.3d at 967 (holding Waller’s “overriding
interest” factor applies in partial closures excluding only some courtroom spectators);
People v. Jones, 750 N.E.2d 524, 529 (N.Y. 2001) (holding, in the partial closure context,
that “[w]hen the procedure requested impacts on a defendant's right to a public trial,
nothing less than an overriding interest can satisfy constitutional scrutiny. . .”).
66. See Turrietta, 308 P.3d at 967. For purposes of this discussion, it is unnecessary
to establish the relative showings that must be made under each standard.
67. This article will use this phrase throughout.
68. See Simmons, 797 F.3d at 414 (“All federal courts of appeals that have
distinguished between partial closures and total closures modify the Waller test so that
the ‘overriding interest’ requirement is replaced by requiring a showing of a
‘substantial reason’ for a partial closure, but the other three factors remain the same.”).
69. In some areas of constitutional law, courts familiarly apply “tiered scrutiny” to
review government actions. These tiers include rational basis scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (describing tiers
of scrutiny in Equal Protection context). Intermediate scrutiny typically requires that
a government action further “an important or substantial governmental interest. . .”
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), and “be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
70. Even were there some small degree of danger to the defendant, other
ameliorative processes have long existed to ensure that no damage is done. We have
both transcripts and the availability of a robust, regular appeals process. As far back as
70 years ago, one commentator wrote that:
Today's judicial administration has two features which, to some degree,
alleviate the necessity for trial publicity-an adequate record of trial court
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Nonetheless, despite partial closures implicating the Sixth
Amendment only minimally, the weight of the jurisprudence treats partial
closures as subject to a significant degree of constitutional scrutiny.71 The
great majority of courts have subjected partial closures to the reduced
form of Waller scrutiny described above. Some courts have gone further,
holding that the full set of Waller protections applies to even partial
closures.72 That is, they conclude that Waller’s requirement of an
“overriding” government interest in support of closure is required even
for partial closures.73 Some commentators have taken a similarly
absolutist stance, contending that full Waller scrutiny is triggered by any
exclusion of a spectator from a courtroom.74 Whatever the form of the test
used to scrutinize them, partial closures are a well-established facet of
Sixth Amendment law.

IV. THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RULE AND THE RIGHT
TO A PUBLIC TRIAL
The Rule’s regime of mandatory witness exclusion, reviewable only
for abuse of discretion, is different in kind from – and at odds with – the
scrutiny courts apply to the exclusion of individuals under the partial
closure doctrine. Partial closures – the exclusion of individuals from the
courtroom – are typically reviewed under the modified Waller test, a type
of intermediate constitutional scrutiny. They are not instituted as a
matter of course, but only after careful consideration of the need for the
closure, and the possibility of alternative ways to satisfy that need. If the
exclusion of an individual or some group of people is considered a closure
of some type, and if that designation triggers heightened scrutiny, a
mandatory, automatic exclusion under the Rule – on mere request –
seems unconstitutional.
If the exclusion of anyone may be considered a Constitutionallysuspect courtroom closure, witness sequestration must comply with
constitutional requirements. Cases analyzing partial closures do not seem
to make distinctions about who is excluded. 75 If anyone is required to stay
outside, a partial closure has occurred, and a modified Waller analysis
must be applied to justify the exclusion. The Constitution, of course,
prevails over rules of evidence.76 On their faces, the Rule and the
proceedings and appellate facilities for correcting errors below. Any abuses
clear enough to be obvious to the court room audience are not likely to escape
the reviewing court.
Harold Shapiro, Right to a Public Trial, 41 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 782, 787 (1951).
71. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
72. E.g., State v. Turrietta, 2013-NMSC-036, ¶ 4, 308 P.3d 964, 970.
73. Id.
74. Saetveit, supra note 59, at 926, Levitas, supra note 60, at 535.
75. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
76. E.g., Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 1933) (“A rule of practice
must not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail over a constitutional right.”)
(internal citation omitted).
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Constitution conflict.
There are significant obstacles posed to witness sequestration if the
scrutiny required by the modified Waller partial closure approach is
made categorically applicable to the exclusion of witnesses. They are
threefold: (1) that the interest advanced to justify the closure is found
“likely to be prejudiced,” (2) that the closure be “no broader than
necessary,” and (3) that specific findings be made.77
Applying some parts of the modified Waller test to particular
witness sequestrations may be easy. For instance, in many cases,
sequestration will serve an important purpose – the truth-seeking
purpose of preventing a witness from crafting testimony.78 The test,
however, requires not only an important purpose, but a finding that the
purpose sought to be advanced is “likely to be prejudiced.”79 This may be
very difficult to determine in an individual case, and very burdensome to
explore. For example, if the concern is collusion between witnesses, must
there be an extensive proffer of their potential testimony to examine
areas of potential overlap? Recall that witness exclusion happens on
request under the Rule.80 But, a public trial analysis does not accept
automatic closures.81 Automatic exclusion fails to consider what the
specific testimony may be and the seriousness of the risks of witness
collusion (or other witness concerns). A response that witness
sequestration has a tendency, generally, to further truth-seeking would
be inadequate.82 Heightened scrutiny typically requires individualized
assessment, not resort to generalization: “reliance on the ‘aggregate’ and
on probabilities [would indicate an abandonment of] heightened scrutiny,
which requires a direct rather than approximate fit of means to ends.” 83
If exclusion is automatic, on request, it fails to assess the likelihood that
the truth-seeking function of exclusion would be impaired without the
specific exclusion order at issue.
Related to the prejudice requirement, the requirement that the
closure – the exclusion of the witness – be narrowly tailored and “no
broader than necessary” to accomplish that purpose84 may also be
difficult to justify in a sequestration order. Narrow tailoring requires

77. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
78. See, e.g., United States v. McPherson, 587 F. App’x 556, 566 (11th Cir. 2014)
(concluding that the Rule’s goal of preventing false testimony is a “substantial reason”
under the modified Waller analysis).
79 Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
80. FED. R. EVID. 615.
81. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 (providing conditions that must be met for a closure
to pass constitutional muster).
82. State v. Decker, 2018 ND 43, ¶ 10, 907 N.W.2d 378, 384 (condemning reliance
on “a generic, broad rationale [that] would permit courtroom closure nearly any
time.”).
83. Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 620 (1990) (O’Connor, J. dissenting),
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). See also
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 521 (2005) (noting, in race discrimination case, the
court’s preference for individualized assessment over generalization).
84. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
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perhaps a “least restrictive alternative,”85 and at least the consideration
of alternatives.86 To determine if there is a danger to honest testimony,
the court may, again, need extensive proffers to determine what the
parties will testify about, and how they might influence each other. The
broad injunction of “witnesses out” would have to be replaced with a
more nuanced assessment of possible outcomes. A Sixth Amendmentsensitive inquiry might result in some witnesses being sequestered, while
others are permitted to remain.
Moreover, Waller’s test (including the modified partial closure
version), requires the entry of findings sufficient to support the decision,
that is, an explanation for why the decision to exclude is appropriate in a
particular case.87 But, sequestration orders are rarely supported by
detailed findings: “[i]n practice, it is most common for trial courts to enter
highly abbreviated orders on the subject.”88 An order indicating only that
the excluded person was a potential witness should be inadequate to
document the necessity of exclusion.
To the extent the partial closure doctrine is a viable one, and to the
extent witness exclusion is a partial closure by definition, the Rule’s
mandatory application and presumptive applicability are at odds with the
Sixth Amendment’s more nuanced demands. The modified Waller test
requires individualized determinations of both the interest at stake and
the likelihood that the interest will be prejudiced without exclusion. 89 The
test requires that closures not be mandatory on request, but be ordered
only on a strong showing of need and appropriateness.90 And, indeed, the
partial closure doctrine presumes the invalidity of the closure – the
starting point is one of openness that must be overcome.91 This is the
opposite of the approach under the Rule, which presumes witnesses will
be excluded.92

A. Judicial Responses to the Conflict
Some criminal defendants have identified the possibility that
witness exclusion may effect a partial closure of the courtroom, and have
complained that their Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the
requirement that witnesses leave the courtroom. The courts have almost
uniformly rejected these challenges, typically in a summary way. For
instance, in State v. Culkin,93 the defendant claimed that his right to a
public trial was violated when the trial court excluded his father from the
85. Sable Commc’ns of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989).
86. Waller makes this explicit, providing, in its third prong, that the trial court
“must consider reasonable alternatives” to closure. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
87. See id.
88. OHIO EVID. R. 615 staff note 2003 amendment.
89. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
90. Id.
91. See Williams v. Burt, 949 F.3d 966, 975 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 276
(2020).
92. Opus 3 Ltd., 91 F.3d at 628.
93. State v. Culkin, 35 P.3d 233, 238 (Haw. 2001).
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courtroom as a potential prosecution rebuttal witness, in accordance
with Hawaii’s version of the Rule.94 Without significant analysis – and no
mention of the Waller test – the Supreme Court of Hawai’i rejected the
contention.95
First, the court noted the truth-seeking purposes of the Rule.96 The
court then acknowledged the abuse deterrence purpose of the right to a
public trial.97 It then concluded that “the right to a public trial is not
implicated by the exclusion of a potential witness pursuant to the witness
exclusionary rule. Both the witness exclusionary rule and the right to a
public trial ensure, inter alia, the appearance of fairness at trial.”98 The
court did no more than note that each procedure has a salutary purpose.
It did not wrestle with the ways in which they are potentially at odds.
The Georgia Supreme Court faced a similar situation in Nicely v.
State.99 There, the defendant alleged that sequestration of his father
under Georgia’s version of the Rule100 violated his Sixth Amendment right
to a public trial.101 The Court wrote that the defendant did:
not point us to a single case in which the sequestration of a witness was
held to violate the right to a public trial, and we have found none. To the
contrary, we have found case upon case in which courts have held that the
rule of sequestration ordinarily does not even implicate the right to public
trial, much less infringe upon it.102

Court after court makes similar statements about the inapplicability
of Sixth Amendment rules to sequestrations.103 Some have concluded,
94. Id. at 258.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 259.
97. Id.
98. Id. This conclusion was reiterated by the Intermediate Appeals Court of Hawai’i
in State v. Jin Wang, 445 P.3d 145 (Haw. Ct. App. 2019).
99. Nicely v. State, 733 S.E.2d 715, 720 (Ga. 2012).
100. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-615 (West).
101. Nicely, 733 S.E.2d at 720.
102. Id.
103. Com. v. Collins, 21 N.E.3d 528, 541 (Mass. 2014) (“It is plain that, after the jury
are sworn, a sequestration order that excludes from the court room all persons whom
the parties have identified as potential witnesses at trial does not constitute a partial
closure and therefore requires no specific findings that the sequestration is
necessary.”); People v. McRae, 47 Misc. 3d 619, 623 (N.Y.Crim. Ct. 2015), aff’d, 61 Misc.
3d 155(A), 112 N.Y.S.3d 409 (N.Y. App. Term. 2018) (“A common exception to the right
of the public to attend a trial is the witness sequestration rule.”); State v. Hancock, 379
P.3d 1024, 1027 (Az. Ct. App. 2016) (“[W]e have found no cases, in Arizona or
elsewhere, holding that exclusion of potential witnesses violated the right to a public
trial.”); People v. Jones, 2020 CO *45 n.2, 464 P.3d 735, 741 (2020) (“. . .it is wellaccepted that sequestration orders do not implicate this right.”); Daly v. United States,
No. 97-CV-2385 TCP, 2012 WL 1672932, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2012) (“. . .the test
related to courtroom closures is simply inapplicable to the subject of Daly's habeas
petition which concerned the exclusion of potential witnesses under FRE 615.”);
United States v. Love, 743 F. App’x 138, 138 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Rule 615 sequestrations
do not violate the Sixth Amendment’s public-trial guarantees.”); People v. Nevarez, 245
A.D.2d 173, 173, 665 N.Y.S.2d 890, 890 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (“She was properly
excluded since the prosecutor, whose good faith was unchallenged by defendant at
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taking an outlier position, that the partial closure worked by
sequestration is permissible because partial closures are not
constitutionally significant.104 At least one court has taken a semantic
route to its conclusion, opining that once someone is designated as a
“witness” they are no longer a part of the “public” contemplated by the
phrase “public trial.”105
Courts have occasionally been receptive to the idea that the Sixth
Amendment may need to be considered when issuing a witness
sequestration order. In one Eighth Circuit case, the Court of Appeals,
while again concluding summarily that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in ordering exclusion under the Rule, noted that the trial court
had considered the public trial implications of sequestration: “to the
extent that the exclusion . . . amounts to a partial closure of the
proceedings, the district court made express findings as to why partial
closure was warranted under the circumstances.”106 A subsequent Eighth
Circuit case, however, simply presumed the applicability of the Rule over
a public trial objection.107
A recent unpublished Ninth Circuit case determined that a
sequestration order, by its terms, satisfied constitutional requirements
for a partial closure under the modified Waller test.108 The court
recounted that “[t]he government subpoenaed [defendant’s] nephew and
another observer and invoked Rule 615, and the district court excluded
them under that rule.”109 Concluding that this was neither an abuse of
discretion as an evidentiary ruling, nor a violation of the right to a public
trial, the court presumed that the exclusion worked a partial closure of

trial, identified her as a potential witness, and the court's discretionary determination
‘did not implicate defendant's right to a public trial.’”) (citation omitted).
104. Buckman v. Roden, No. 13-CV-11413-IT, 2015 WL 1206348, at *4 (D. Mass.
Mar. 17, 2015) (holding that sequestration order did not violate the right to a public
trial because it does not protect against partial closures); Zornes v. Smith, No. 16-CV1730 (ECT/KMM), 2020 WL 4288312, at *7 (D. Minn. July 27, 2020) (holding that
sequestration order did not violate the right to a public trial because it was not
objectively unreasonable for court to believe right does not protect against partial
closures); State v. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d 1, 53 (Tenn. 2010) (holding that “the rule does
not threaten any” of the interests protected by the right to a public trial).
105. Tharp v. State, 362 Md. 77, 95, 763 A.2d 151, 160 (Md. 2000) (concluding that
the Rule “is a clear exception to a criminal defendant's right to a public trial. In effect,
those sequestered by Rule 5–615 are no longer considered members of the general
public for purposes of exclusion from the courtroom during criminal proceedings, and
a criminal defendant's right to a public trial is in no way damaged by proper
sequestration under [Maryland] Rule 5–615.”). This approach has some appeal, but the
right to a public trial seems less about a talismanic identification of an “in” or “out”
group than about a presumption of openness that can be overcome only with sufficient
justification. Historical understanding of the scope of openness, as I argue here, is one
such justification.
106. United States v. Blanche, 149 F.3d 763, 770 (8th Cir. 1998).
107. United States v. Ricker, 983 F.3d 987, 995 (8th Cir. 2020), as corrected (Dec.
29, 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2687, 210 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2021).
108. United States v. Sanchez, 853 Fed.Appx. 141, 143-44 (9th Cir. 2021).
109. Id. at 143.
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the courtroom.110 It held the closure was permissible, concluding that
“because the government proffered a legitimate basis for the subpoena,
there was a ‘substantial reason’ for the partial closure.”111 The court did
not inquire into the case-specific strength of that “legitimate basis,”
however, nor investigate the other elements of the modified Waller test.
There are examples of courts performing a more detailed Sixth
Amendment analysis in response to a request for sequestration. For
instance, in State v. Daugherty,112 the defendant claimed that the trial
court violated his right to a public trial when it sequestered subpoenaed
witnesses from the courtroom. He alleged that “the subpoenas were a
sham device designed to exclude the friends and family members from
the trial.”113 The court of appeals noted that the trial court had performed
a Waller-like review of the exclusion in entering its order.114 It “made a
record of its basis for exclusion and the identity of potential witnesses and
that record shows that the court balanced the defendant's right to a public
trial with the State's interest in preserving the integrity of potential
witnesses. Thus, Daugherty's constitutional claim fails.”115
The issue of a potential “sham device,” a weaponization of the Rule,
has been the only instance in which a public trial objection has been able
to overcome sequestrations under the Rule. Addy v. State116 and State v.
Sams117 aptly illustrate the danger to public trial interests that witness
sequestration requests may pose. Both involve prosecutors invoking the
Rule in bad faith, not to exclude individuals based on their status as
witnesses, but for some other reason.
In Addy, the prosecutor identified six members of the courtroom
audience as potential witnesses and requested that they be “placed under
the rule as potential witnesses.”118 Defendant’s counsel protested
immediately, indicating that the spectators were “not witnesses, they are
friends of the Defendant's [sic]. They are not going to testify.” 119 The
prosecutor responded, indicating that she was going to call them.120
The defense attorney, recognizing the subterfuge, explained the
public trial problem to the trial court:
Your honor, before they are excluded, I would ask that they be released
from the Rule. They have no knowledge of any of the facts of this case. They
are friends of the Defendant. The Prosecution has chosen to swear these
people in for the sole purpose of getting them outside the courtroom. She
has no idea who they are or what they are going to say. We object, Mr. Addy
110. Id. (“The government concedes that excluding the nephew constituted a
partial closure.”).
111. Id. at 143-44.
112. State v. Daugherty, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 395, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
113. Id. at *2.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Addy v. State, 849 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Tex. App. 1993).
117. State v. Sams, 802 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
118. Addy, 849 S.W.2d at 426.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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has the right to have these people present in the courtroom as they have no,
no information concerning anything having to do with this case, and I would
ask the Court to inquire if the Court chooses, but to deprive Mr. Addy of
access to his friends in a public courtroom is a deprivation of his rights as
guaranteed to him by the 6th Amendment, and we would ask the Court to,
at the very least, make an inquiry of each of these folks.121

The Court enforced the Rule against the spectators, relying on the
prosecutor’s assertion that there was a “great possibility” that she would
call the spectators.122 Ultimately, she did not call any of the excluded
audience members, and, in a colloquy with the trial court, indicated her
reason for excluding them had not been for sequestration purposes, but
because she “felt there was a grave security issue with our informant.” 123
The Court of Appeals concluded that Addy’s right to a public trial had
been violated.124 It specifically concluded that witness sequestration
could not be invoked to exclude spectators in furtherance of nonsequestration purposes:
The State claims that the mandatory language of Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 613, the
“exclusion of witnesses rule,” permits it to identify any spectator as a
witness and have that person removed from the courtroom. We disagree. If
this were true, the prosecution would have unlimited power to control who
stayed in the courtroom during trial by merely invoking the provisions of
the “exclusion of witnesses rule” to those it considered undesirable as
spectators.125

In State v. Sams, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals similarly
condemned a prosecutor’s pretextual use of the Rule.126 There, the
prosecutor contended that the defendant’s family members were creating
a disturbance in the courtroom by speaking loudly during the
proceedings.127 Responding to this purported disturbance, the prosecutor
told the court that he had, “served five (5) subpoenas, had the officers
serve five (5) subpoenas on those people, and since the defendant has
asked for the rule, I would ask that they step out.”128 The trial court
ordered sequestration of the spectators.129
The Criminal Court of Appeals easily identified the bad faith
invocation of the rule, writing that “[t]he statements made by the
assistant district attorney general make it crystal clear that he used the
subpoena power of the trial court as a subterfuge for excluding the
appellant's relatives from the courtroom. He had no intention of calling
these individuals as witnesses.”130 Accordingly, the court subjected the

121. Id. at 426-27.
122. Id. at 427.
123. Id. at 428.
124. Id. at 430.
125. Id. at 429.
126. Sams, 802 S.W.2d at 641.
127. Id. at 636.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 637.
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exclusion of the defendant’s family members to a partial closure
analysis.131 It concluded that their exclusion foundered on the first
element of the modified Waller test – no “substantial reason” existed to
remove the family members from the courtroom.132 The defendant’s
conviction was reversed.133
Disingenuous use of sequestration requests is not unheard of. For
example, while the court acceded to the following exclusion, the facts
suggest a non-testimonial purpose to the invocation of the Rule:
During a break in the cross-examination of the government's
witness Todd Middleton, he indicated his intention to recant his
testimony. The Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) advised the
Court that he believed that two women in the gallery “might have ‘had
something to do with’ Middleton's sudden repudiation of his testimony.”
The AUSA then moved for the exclusion, under Federal Rule of Evidence
615, of all of Daly's relatives as well as co-defendants Warren Nadel and
Vincent Lopez on the basis they were potential witnesses. The Court
ordered the exclusion of “all relatives of the defense . . . from the trial on
the motion of the United States Attorney.”134
A better conclusion here would have been to follow the lead of Sams
and subject the exclusion of the relatives to a modified Waller analysis.
The purpose of the exclusion was facially unrelated to any prospective
testimony by the relatives. In the absence of any relationship between
exclusion and testimony, the Rule has no application.

V.

THE RULE AND THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL CAN COEXIST

Standard implementation of the Rule will not result in Sixth
Amendment violations. Historical understandings of the Sixth
Amendment’s public trial right would have contemplated longstanding
witness sequestration rules. Moreover, witness sequestration ordinarily
causes no meaningful prejudice to the amendment’s purposes.

A. The History of Witness Sequestration
The best reason for courts to resist assertions that the Sixth
Amendment should overcome witness sequestration requests is the
history of coexistence of the Rule and the right to a public trial. The
provenance of witness sequestration is long. “The merit of such a rule has
been recognized since at least biblical times.” 135 Accordingly, the original
– and ongoing – understanding of an open courtroom would have been
one that is open except to potential witnesses.
Originalists, of course, may especially value the historical

131. Id. at 640.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 641.
134. Daly, 2012 WL 13176319 at *1.
135. Opus 3 Ltd., 91 F.3d at 628.
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evidence.136 But one need not adhere to the project of originalism to
recognize the value of history in determining the scope of a constitutional
right: “[v]irtually everyone agrees that the specific intentions of the
Framers count for something.”137 Original meaning provides guidance,
perhaps not binding, but at least highly instructive. “Original
understanding is therefore a component of pragmatist constitutional
adjudication.”138
Post-ratification history also matters to the act of constitutional
interpretation. “[I]interpretation of the Constitution is guided by a
Government practice that ‘has been open, widespread, and unchallenged
since the early days of the Republic.’”139 The Supreme Court recently
relied on a post-ratification “history of regulating off-premises signs” to
determine that such regulation was permitted, and not an example of
content discrimination prohibited by the First Amendment.140 The court
noted that the types of signs at issue “were not present in the founding
era, but as large outdoor advertisements proliferated in the 1800s,
regulation followed. As early as 1932, the Court had already approved a
location-based differential for advertising signs.”141 The court concluded
that “[t]he unbroken tradition of on-/off-premises distinctions counsels
against the adoption of [a] novel rule.”142 The Rule shares a similar
“unbroken tradition” of implementation.
The history of the Rule, in times proximate to ratification of the Sixth
Amendment 143 and in the centuries subsequent, suggests that its validity
136. E.g., United States v. Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539, 1556 (2022) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (invoking “legally justified tools . . . including not just the Constitution's
text and its original understanding but the Nation's historical practices. . .”); Carpenter
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2250 (2018) (Alito, J. dissenting) (“[H]istory . . . tells
us what was on the minds of those who ratified the Fourth Amendment and how they
understood its scope.”).
137. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 881 (1996).
138. Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1380 (1990).
See also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2009) (“Not
a single self-identifying non-originalist of whom I'm aware argues that original
meaning has no bearing on proper judicial constitutional interpretation. To the
contrary, even those scholars most closely identified with non-originalism . . . explicitly
assign original meaning or intentions a significant role in the interpretive enterprise.”).
139. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2567 (2019) (quoting NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 572 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)). See United
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 519 (1995) (“[U]niform postratification practice can
shed light upon the meaning of an ambiguous constitutional provision.”).
140. City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, LLC, No. 20-1029, 2022
WL 1177494, at *7 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2022).
141. Id.
142. Id. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446 (2015) (recognizing
“history and tradition of regulation” as relevant when considering the scope of the First
Amendment).
143. The historical record of what the Founders expected of the right to a public
trial is very thin. Indeed, the right “was not a subject of debate or discussion” as the Bill
of Rights was considered. SUSAN N. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL: A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 18 (2006); see Radin, supra note
53, at 388 (“It is likely that the word ‘public’ was introduced into the list of the rights
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has gone unquestioned. While there is little or no 18th or 19th Century
law directly confronting the relationship between the Rule and the right
to a public trial, when the right was added to the Constitution, the Rule
was a familiar tool of courtroom management. The “trial” that the Sixth
Amendment required to be “public” was one that anticipated existing
sequestration procedures.144
Professor Wigmore, in a seminal article on witness sequestration,
canvassed the Rule’s history.145 He begins by recounting the biblical story
of Susanna, in the Book of Daniel.146 The story has been often retold in
subsequent accounts of witness sequestration rules.147 In short, Susanna
was accused of adultery, on the accounts of two maids.148 Daniel said,
“[p]ut these two aside, one far from another, and I will examine them.”149
Questioning them individually, he heard different stories from each,
putting the lie to their testimony about Susanna.150 Wigmore writes that
“[f]rom almost the beginning of our recorded trials, the story is found
repeatedly cited, and was a favorite text of invocation.” 151 He reported the
story of Susanna appearing in texts from the 15th Century152 and reports
of trials in the 17th Century.153 He asserts that “[f]rom the beginning of
this epoch, and onwards, it is clear that the practice [of sequestration] was
well known and often used [and] has persisted in this manner without
essential change.”154 While Wigmore was reporting only on the Rule’s
history, and not its interaction with the right to a public trial, his
identification of the widespread use and familiarity of the rule
simultaneously identifies a bedrock principle of trials. The original
understanding of a public trial was one that simultaneously incorporated
the Rule.
While most writers on the Rule have relied (rightfully) on Wigmore’s

of free men . . . without very much concrete example in mind of what publicity implied
and without a clear idea of what it was meant to secure.”).
144. Of course, some evidence rules have changed since the 18th Century. For
instance, “[d]isqualification [of witnesses with an interest in the proceeding] greatly
narrowed the range of potential witness testimony at common law trial. The most
valuable witnesses (the parties and their privies) were routinely unavailable.” John H.
Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1185 (1996). Today, of course, Rule 615 and equivalents
expressly permit parties to testify.
145. Wigmore, supra note 21.
146. Id. at 476.
147. E.g., Sarah Chapman Carter, Exclusion of Justice: The Need for A Consistent
Application of Witness Sequestration Under Federal Rule of Evidence 615, 30 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 63 (2004); Matthew M. Valcourt, Rule 615-Beyond the Walls of the Courtroom
Proper: Efficacious Truth-Seeking Device or Toothless Tiger?, 10 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 115 (2005).
148. Wigmore, supra note 21, at 475.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 476 n.3.
153. Id. See also id. at 482-84.
154. Id. at 478.
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historical research to explain the rule’s pedigree,155 this article attempts
to append a few notes to the historical record subsequent to ratification.
References to the Rule in early 19th Century cases and treatises, for
instance, make it even clearer that the Rule was, as Wigmore asserts,
“well known and often used” rather than a novelty. By doing so, the case
is made stronger that excluding a witness was considered a standard
courtroom management tool, rather than an unconstitutional partial
closure of the courtroom.
Many 18th and 19th Century evidence treatises include portions
setting forth the Rule. Some do not describe it, but none indicate that the
Rule is not a standard trial management tool.
The treatises are occasionally explanatory, but some report only
results in prior cases, much like the squibs in a digest or in notes of
decision. An example of the latter is provided in Charles Viner’s 1792
treatise which reports: “[w]here two witnesses were produced as
witnesses, to prove a bond suspected of forgery, the Court upon motion
ordered the witnesses to be examined apart, and the one not in the
hearing of the other.” 156 The Viner treatise was cited in support of
evidentiary principles in three Supreme Court cases at the turn of the
19th Century, suggesting its weight as a source.157 The Underhill and
Wharton treatises similarly catalog citations to numerous 19th century
witness sequestration cases, without significant commentary.158
More explanatory, descriptive coverage of the Rule is included in
other treatises, including editions of Simon Greenleaf’s A Treatise on the
Law of Evidence. Greenleaf was a legal commentator of consequence; an
early Yale Law Journal review of his treatise stated that “to quote from
Greenleaf is to quote law.”159In his 1842 edition, Greenleaf writes that “[i]f
the judge deems it essential to the discovery of Truth, that the witnesses
should be examined out of the hearing of each other, he will so order it; and
this order upon the motion or suggestion of either party is rarely
withheld.”160 In a later edition, he writes that “[i]n the ordinary practice
of the court, the witnesses are examined apart from each other, no
witness being allowed to be present during the examination of another
who is called before him.”161
155. See Carter supra note 113.
156. 12 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 47 (London, G.
G. J. and J. Robinson, T. Payne, E. and R. Brooke, T. Whieldon and J. Butterworth; and L.
White 2d ed. 1792).
157. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. 187, 207 (1804); Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. 246, 301
(1818); Doe ex dem. Patterson v. Winn, 30 U.S. 233, 242 (1831).
158. H.C. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 359
(Indianapolis, Bowen-Merrill 1898); FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ISSUES § 446 (Rochester, Lawyers Co-operative Pub. Co. 1912).
159. Book Review, 9 YALE L.J. 72 (1899) (reviewing SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (John Henry Wigmore ed., 16th ed. The Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd. (2001) (1899)).
160. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 432 (Boston, C.C.
Little & J. Brown 1842).
161. 3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 491 (Boston, C.C.
Little & J. Brown 13th ed. 1876). Although included in a section on courts-martial, this
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Further prescriptive material adding to the case that the Rule was
well known in early American history is provided in the Notes to
Phillipps’ Treatise on the Laws of Evidence, from 1839.162 The Rule is
described in some procedural detail:
[w]here witnesses are ordered to withdraw, each party furnishes his list of
them to the sheriff, whose duty it then becomes to take charge of them, and
see that they are kept out of the hearing of each other's examination; and if
the order be violated, he will then know it and apprise the party.163

Review of the Gilbert and Bathurst treatises164 reveals no references
to witness sequestration.
Cases from the early 19th Century also indicate awareness, use, and
the propriety of witness sequestration. Many are cited in the foregoing
treatises, some are mentioned by Wigmore.165 The few others available,
like many 18th and 19th Century decisions, tend to be quite cursory. They
are cited not for their depth of analysis, but for their acknowledgement of
the Rule.
For example, in the 1830 case Com. v. Knapp,166 the court provided
familiar language describing the Rule: “[i]n a capital trial, the Court, upon
motion, will exclude from the courtroom all the witnesses except the one
under examination.”167 In the 1834 case United States v. Gibert,168 the
court, recounting the course of trial, reported that witnesses had been
sequestered in a trial for robbery on the high seas. Describing the rule as
non-mandatory, the 1840 case Keith v. Wilson169 wrote that the Rule
“appears from all the authorities, [to be] not an inflexible rule, but the
exclusion of a witness under it must depend somewhat on the discretion
of the court.”170
Judge William Cranch, of the District of Columbia Circuit, provided
mixed signals on the rule. In the 1834 case United States v. Woods,171 he
“observed that . . . if [the court] had been originally asked to exclude all
the witnesses on both sides, except the one under examination, it is
probable the court would have granted it.”172 In an 1808 case, however,

was not intended to be limited to such courts. He indicates that courts-martial “are
bound, in general, to observe the rules of evidence by which the courts of criminal
jurisdiction are governed.” Id. at § 476.
162. ESEK COWEN, NOTES TO PHILLIPPS’ TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF EVIDENCE 720 (Gould
Banks 1839).
163. Id.
164. See generally GEOFFREY GILBERT, LAW OF EVIDENCE (Philadelphia, Joseph
Crukshank 7th ed. 1805); EARL H. BATHURST, THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE (Dublin, Sarah
Cotter 1761).
165. Wigmore, supra note 21.
166. Com. v. Knapp, 26 Mass. 496, 505 (1830).
167. Id.
168. United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1293 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
169. Keith v. Wilson, 6 Mo. 435, 441 (Mo. 1840).
170. Id.
171. United States v. Woods, 28 F. Cas. 762, 763 (C.C.D.D.C. 1834).
172. Id.
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he appeared to express concern about the rule. In Joice v. Alexander, 173
defendant’s counsel:
[S]uggested that the witnesses for the petitioner were of bad character, and
believed they would not testify fairly if permitted to hear each other’s
testimony, and moved the court to direct that all the plaintiff’s witnesses
but one should be excluded from the court room, which THE COURT
granted; CRANCH, Chief Judge, doubting very much as to the propriety of
such a practice as a general rule, without some further evidence of
combination or corruption.174

This indicates that Judge Cranch had some hesitation about the rule,
but the excerpt suggests that his issue may not have been with
sequestration, generally, but with basing a sequestration order on an
assertion about the personal qualities of the witnesses.
In any event, Cranch’s hesitation about applying the Rule in Joice is
very much the exception. In case after case, and treatise after treatise,
judges and commentators acknowledge and apply the Rule. There is no
history of the Rule that indicates that it is anything but commonplace. No
“founding father,” no ratifier, and no judge in the 18th or 19th Century
would have thought that it was at all unusual to exclude potential
witnesses. Their visions, and our ongoing understandings, of a public trial
were and are ones that would accommodate this standard procedure.

B. Witness Sequestration is Consistent with the Purposes of
the Right to a Public Trial
As indicated above, if witness exclusion orders must be subjected to
modified Waller analyses as a matter of course, they will have difficulty
passing muster.175 The mandatory nature of exclusion orders, issued on
request, is at odds with the mechanics and demands of heightened
scrutiny. The first response to this is the historical one – the history of the
practice indicates no one expected heightened scrutiny of each
sequestration request. But this seems inadequate, standing alone. It
should further be shown that sequestration does not damage the goals of
the right to a public trial. Accordingly, some review of the relationship
between the Sixth Amendment’s purposes and the practice of witness
exclusion makes sense. On top of historical practice, sequestration
procedures are congruent with Sixth Amendment values.
The Supreme Court has explained that the Sixth Amendment’s right
to a public trial exists to: (1) “ensure[] that judge and prosecutor carry
out their duties responsibly,” (2) “encourage[] witnesses to come
forward” and (3) “discourage[] perjury.”176
The first purpose is to deter trial actors from engaging in rightsdenying behavior. The Sixth Amendment’s abuse-deterrence purpose will
173. Joice v. Alexander, 13 F. Cas. 907, 907 (C.C.D.D.C. 1808).
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. See supra Section IV.
176. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46.
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be minimally implicated in most cases of witness exclusion, as in other
partial closures. If the right to a public trial is about shining sunlight on
the proceedings, the presence of any members of the public should
achieve that. The exclusion of an individual or small group places a
vanishingly small impediment in the way of the Sixth Amendment’s goal
of fair procedure.
It may be useful to consider the possible abuses that the right to a
public trial could prevent. Courts invoking the right frequently describe
its purpose as preventing “the abuses which history shows were brought
about by secret trials.”177 At the most egregious – and, frankly,
preposterous – end would be physical intimidation of the defendant:
torture, a forced confession.178 The presence of any observer should be an
adequate deterrent to keep the prosecutor or judge from engaging in
overtly wrongful behavior. So, are there more believable wrongs that a
judge or prosecutor might perpetrate in a courtroom in which someone
has been excluded? These would have to be wrongs that are more in the
nature of malum prohibitum – wrongs that are not obvious but made
illegal by positive law. These might include violations of evidence rules,
or improper communications between prosecutor and judge. These
actions should be objected to by defense counsel (who would certainly be
present).179 Moreover, they might be rectified on appeal. But to the extent
that the possibility of some real-time response by an in-court observer is
required to ensure fairness, there is no reason to believe that the presence
of a particular fact witness will dissuade the judge or prosecutor from
engaging in gross legal error. Moreover, very few lay witnesses would
have the knowledge necessary to discern the nature of the legal wrong
taking place before them.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the presence of friends and
family is a particular concern of the Sixth Amendment.180 Of those
witnesses potentially excluded by the Rule, there’s no question that a
family member, who is also a potential witness, will be more interested in
and attuned to the way a trial is conducted than will a spectator “off the
street.” Family members may, indeed, be the best auditor of the
proceedings, making sure that no rights-denying tricks are played by the
judge or prosecutor (if they possess the knowledge of what those tricks
might be). But to the extent the right to a public trial exists to remind the
prosecutor and judge of their duties, the presence of any eyes should
almost always suffice:
[T]he presence of others may affect human experience in various ways: it

177. State v. Croak, 118 So. 703, 704 (La. 1928).
178. Forced confessions outside the courtroom are perhaps less preposterous. See
Coerced to Confess: How U.S. Police Get Confessions (Mar. 20, 2019), Al Jazeera,
www.aljazeera.com/features/2019/3/20/coerced-to-confess-how-us-police-getconfessions [perma.cc/92EF-VTGZ].
179. A jury might also be present, but the right to a jury is provided textually in the
Sixth Amendment, independently from the right to a public trial. This indicates that the
presence of a jury alone does not satisfy the right to a public trial.
180. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268.

2022]

Witness Exclusion and the Right to a Public Trial

23

can inhibit or facilitate public performances; . . . and may trigger selfevaluations and result in behavior adjustments. . . In other words, the
presence of others can be seen as a social force, affecting feelings,
cognitions, and, to some degree, behaviors.181

So long as there are observers, or even the possibility of observers
(not all trials are well-attended), the Sixth Amendment’s commitment to
ensuring fair proceedings is satisfied. Fair proceedings are not ordinarily
compromised by excluding a potential witness, including a family
member of the defendant, from the courtroom. Even if a witness is
excluded, trial participants still know that their actions are subject to
review by any other auditor who may enter the courtroom.
The second purpose of the right to a public trial, encouraging
witnesses to come forward, stems from a simple proposition – if the trial
is known to the public, those members of the public with knowledge of
the case will be able to approach the parties to offer their testimony. 182
Nothing about witness sequestration conflicts with this “witnessattraction” function.
Finally, the same is true of purpose of discouraging perjury. This
purpose is achieved in a straightforward way, with the sunlight of
publicity.183 If a witness is lying, and someone in the audience perceives
it, the observer with knowledge of the lie can approach the parties to let
them know. An excluded witness will do an even better job of
accomplishing this goal. Indeed, impeding perjury is the point of witness
exclusion: “[i]t exercises a restraint on witnesses ‘tailoring’ their
testimony to that of earlier witnesses; and it aids in detecting testimony
that is less than candid.”184 The excluded witness lays in wait precisely to
capture the unwary perjurer, not from the audience, but from the witness
stand, typically with the guidance of counsel.
There is minimal-to-no prejudice done to the purposes of the right
to a public trial by the exclusion of witnesses in the courtroom. Taken in
combination with sequestration’s “unbroken tradition” of use, invocation
of the Rule should almost never trigger a Waller analysis.

VI. AN APPROACH TO THE LIMIT CASES
But there are limits to this broad acceptability. The right to a public
trial will be implicated in some situations, warranting Sixth Amendment

181. Thomas J. L. van Rompay, Dorette J. Vonk, Marieke L. Fransen, The Eye of the
Camera Effects of Security Cameras on Prosocial Behavior, 41 ENVIRONMENT & BEHAVIOR
60, 61-62 (2009) (citations omitted) (reviewing previous research).
182. See State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Minn. 1966) ([T]he possibility that
some spectator drawn to the trial may prove to be an undiscovered witness in
possession of critical evidence cannot be ignored.”).
183. See Schmit, 139 N.W.2d at 806-07 (“The presence of an audience does have a
wholesome effect on trustworthiness since witnesses are less likely to testify falsely
before a public gathering.”).
184. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976).
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scrutiny. As the Addy185 and Sams186 cases indicate, there are instances
where witness exclusion and the right to a public trial will meaningfully
conflict. Accordingly, courts should have tools that can enable them to
both honor standard practice and protect constitutional rights. If a
prosecutor invokes sequestration in a way that eliminates significant
public participation, and a defendant can make an initial showing of bad
faith, a court should determine whether a suspicious blanket
sequestration order is appropriate.
Consistent with both historical practice and present-day forms of
the Rule, the default, the presumption, should be exclusion on request.
The provenance of the practice is too long and too familiar to be
disturbed. When the Rule is invoked, potential witnesses, as identified by
either side (and not subject to a statutory or common law exception)
should be excluded. That presumption should be almost irrebuttable
when the witness has no personal connection to the defendant. The courts
have been most solicitous of defendants’ public trial rights when friends
and family are involved.187 That solicitousness is not due to strangers to
the defendant. No case subjecting a sequestration order to Waller-like
scrutiny has involved non-affiliated individuals.
But there is no indication that the Rule has applied with any less
force to family and friends, historically. The Rule applies to all witnesses.
Indeed, family and friends may be precisely the people who, as witnesses,
most need to be discouraged from changing their testimony in a way to
help the parties to whom they are intimately connected. So even when a
friend or family member is excluded, the presumption in favor of
sequestration should be strong, though not irrebuttable.
If the Rule should be liberally implemented, what sort of showing
might justify subjecting a sequestration request to a modified Waller
analysis? It seems like too much to ask to require prosecutors to proffer
the testimony they might seek from a prospective family member or
friend.188 First, that would preview their approach, which is at odds with
the principle of sequestration, based on not letting a witness know what’s
coming. Of course, that might be remedied by a proffer in camera. Second,
and more important, prosecutors and defendants themselves may not
know what is coming. Prosecutors may identify a family member or friend
as a potential witness based on a hunch, a belief that the story may unfold
in such a way that the testimony may – not necessarily will – become
appropriate or necessary. Given the vagaries of trial and testimonial
development, the prosecutor should have wide berth to identify and
exclude potential witnesses, including family and friends.
All that said, there will still be instances where the right to a public
185. See generally Addy, 849 S.W.2d at 425.
186. See generally Sams, 802 S.W.2d at 635.
187. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268.
188. This kind of showing is required, however, under the Crime Victims Rights
Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 3771, which permits exclusion of certain crime victims only when
there is clear and convincing that testimony by the victim would be materially altered
if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding.
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trial is implicated, and a modified Waller analysis is appropriate. Again,
Addy and Sams provide apposite illustrations.189 In each of those cases,
the defendant’s counsel argued that not only was the testimony of the
putative witnesses unlikely, but it was also near-certain not to come.
Moreover, in each case the court identified an ulterior motive behind the
sequestration request. When either of these conditions is plausibly
advanced, a court should inquire further.
If the defense asserts an ulterior motive, that the sequestration
request is a sham or subterfuge, some investigation is warranted. In a case
where the prosecutor has admitted a non-sequestration purpose for the
request, as in Daly,190 the Court should subject the exclusion to a modified
Waller analysis. The reason is simple – it is not a request under the Rule
at all, it is a request to exclude a member of the public from the courtroom.
In cases where the prosecutor does not reveal a non-sequestration
purpose, the decision should turn on the plausibility of the prosecutor’s
request. When the defense asserts a lack of witness knowledge, some
inquiry by the court is appropriate, while remaining attentive and
deferent to the possibility that the witness may possess some relevant
information. If the prosecutor cannot provide a plausible reason for why
a spectator – asserted by the defense to be without pertinent knowledge
– should be excluded as a witness, a modified Waller analysis is
appropriate, because an unintelligible request for sequestration suggests
a non-sequestration purpose.

VII. CONCLUSION
Given the overwhelming historical evidence of the common
implementation of witness sequestration and the daily use of the
procedure in courtrooms around the country, it can only be seen as a
standard, ubiquitous tool of courtroom management. The concept of a
public trial contemplates and incorporates the principle of witness
exclusion. Moreover, witness sequestration, ordinarily, does no damage
to the values of the right to a public trial. Even in those cases where
defendant-affiliated persons are excluded under the Rule, it should be
presumed that exclusion under the Rule is valid. It is, of course, extremely
unlikely that prosecutors invoke sequestration to pursue a sub rosa
proceeding in which they and judges in their sway may collude to pursue
an unfair trial. There are occasions, nonetheless, when the Rule is invoked
in bad faith. In those cases, the requested exclusion of witnesses should
not go unscrutinized. A bad faith request for sequestration should pass
through the crucible of the modified Waller analysis that is applied to
partial courtroom closures to test them for their congruence with the
Constitution.

189. See supra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
190. Daly, 2012 WL 13176319 at *1.
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